Misogynist or Merely Outdated? Why Aristotle Cannot be Acquitted of Sexism Anna Milukas, University of Georgia

Misogynist or Merely Outdated? Why Aristotle Cannot be Acquitted of Sexism Anna Milukas, University of Georgia

Aristotle makes several claims about female nature that have been interpreted as sexist. This paper examines two defenses in which Aristotle's sexism is seen as inaccurate.The first argues that the descriptions of women in Aristotle’s writings are not sexist because it is incorrect to try and judge Aristotle by modern standards. The second argues that while Aristotle made statements in his work that seemingly treated women as lesser in regards to the generation of children, this too has been misconstrued and is also not actually sexist. However, both of these defenses can be rejected. The first attempts to dismiss the charges of sexism first by employing too narrow a definition of ideological bias and too broad an allowance of other explanations. The second attempts to excuse gender from the issue of generation yet still fails to explain why women are assigned the lesser generative role.

In his judgments of women, did Aristotle demonstrate a deliberate sexist bias? There are two schools of thought on the answer to this question: First, Aristotle, for various reasons, was indeed a misogynist by the standards of his day or any other. The second general position is that the treatment of women in his philosophical writings is not actually sexist and it is incorrect to try and judge Aristotle by modern standards of gender relations. In this second school of thought, two specific defenses have been proposed that are of interest. First, that Aristotle is not sexist at least in the sense that Aristotle was not consciously ideologically biased against women. Statements made in various biological texts such as History of Animals, Parts of Animals and Generation of Animals are not the result of deliberate misogyny, but rather the lack of scientific knowledge and philosophical conventions of the times. The second defense is that while Aristotle made statements in his work that seemingly treated women as lesser than men especially in regards to womens’ roles in generation of children, some of these statements such as the ones made in Generation of Animals have been misconstrued by posterity and are not actually sexist. It is my intent in this paper to examine two analyses of Aristotle representative of these approaches as presented by Robert Mayhew and M.D. Tress, and determine if the charges of deliberate and conscious sexism laid against Aristotle are indeed false based on these defenses.

Generally, the first defense brought against the charge of sexism in Aristotle’s writings is that in the many cases where Aristotle has been accused of ideological bias, he may be acquitted being found only guilty of drawing conclusions from

contemporary misinformation. Several instances in Aristotle’s writings can be used as pieces of evidence to support this argument, instances which feminist writers have previously pointed out as egregiously misogynistic. These are the issues of generation, of Aristotle’s description of women as mutilated men, of fallacious assumptions about women’s anatomy, and of women’s inferior psychology.1 Drawing from these examples, the argument stands that based on a set definition of ideological bias, Aristotle does not, in fact, demonstrate a ideologically sexist bias against women.

Before commencing an examination of the instances in question from Aristotle’s biological writings, it is first necessary to establish what constitutes the ‘ideological bias’ from which Aristotle is defended. Mayhew presents the following definition: in order for an offending conclusion to be considered ideologically biased, it must be deliberately biased. In other words, the thinker must have been capable of drawing different conclusions, but through evasion, dishonesty, and rationalization, has instead chosen otherwise (Mayhew, 5). There is furthermore a test to determine if this variety of bias has taken place, adapted from Khan, 1990:

An ideological interpretation of some claim is appropriate when the following conditions hold: 1. the claim does in fact tend to promote a specific ideological agenda or justify social interests (i.e., interests of class, social position, gender, etc.); 2. The claim exhibits one of the following two features: a. it rests upon arbitrary or implausible assumptions and/or is supported by unusually bad arguments; b. it conflicts with other fundamental principles held by the same thinker (Mayhew, 7).

There are problems with this definition of ideological bias. First, while it may be a useful exercise for the purposes of this line of defense to limit the definition of ideological bias only to the overtly conscious variety, this is an irresponsible perspective at best. The attempt is to draw a distinction between being influenced by one’s culture against certain groups and the potential of being ideologically biased, when in reality these two things are almost synonymous. The only arguments offered for this distinction are some loose metaphors about aristocrats and philosophers undergoing mental gymnastics to serve their own

There is also the issue of bees, specifically that Aristotle has been accused of sexism for refusing to call bee-1 leaders “queens”, instead of “kings”. Mayhew’s response to this argument is that while it is true that other thinkers of the time, such as Xenophon, were willing to call the bee-leaders queens, given that Aristotle believed bee-leaders were both male and female and was willing to call wasp-leaders “mothers” and treat male insects as generally sexually passive, it is fair to say that this is not an example of Aristotle being especially misogynistic. (Mayhew, 20). For further discussion, see Lloyd 1993 and Lennox 1995.

intellectual ends (Mayhew, 3). While this no doubt often occurs, a person does not have to explicitly decide to demean others in order to make assumptions that reflect the status quo from which that person benefits, and to excuse this human tendency from the charge of bias runs the risk of giving egregiously harmful perspectives credence because ‘he didn’t mean it like that.’ Furthermore, beyond the issues with the narrowness of this definition of ideological bias, it should also be noted that the instances of sexism in Aristotle that are addressed cannot even be excused from even this specific concept of bias- as will be seen shortly.

Having discussed the definition of ideological bias, it is now possible to move forward into an examination of the offending passages in Aristotle. First, there is the contentious issue of the different roles between the male and female in generation. The argument here defends Aristotle from sexism by rejecting the idea that Aristotle subscribed to the sexist ‘Container’ theory of generation in which the female only serves as essentially a feed-bag to sustain the offspring, and contributes nothing to its generation.2 The argument furthermore states that the unquestionably sexist ‘Inert Matter’ theory that the female only passively contributes the matter to the offspring while the male provides the form is also not an accurate assessment of Aristotle’s position (Mayhew, 30). This second idea is rejected on the grounds that it does not take into account that the female also donates ‘seed’ to generation in the form of her menses, which is albeit a less 3 purified variety of seed than the male. Also, the matter found in the female is ‘active’ inasmuch as it contains a preordained set of potential movements to create a person (Mayhew, 41). And finally, the female does contribute part of the soul to the offspring-although admittedly the most base part. She furthermore affects gender and appearance of the offspring (Mayhew, 45, 50). These justifications are used to reject the Inert Matter theory, and somehow absolve Aristotle of sexist ideological bias along the way, a conclusion drawn because while Aristotle referred to the female contribution as ‘inferior’, at least he didn’t treat women as harshly as he could have. However, a difference in degree of an offense does not, ipso facto, remove the offense. This is also missing the main question, which is not if the female contributes the offspring in some significant way, but whether her contributions are equally valuable as those from the male. Aristotle clearly does not

For more discussion, see Dean-Jones, 1994. However, this part is true. There is no question that in 2 Generation of Animals Aristotle believes that the female contributes to generation-but what she contributes is the question.

‘In GA 1.18, Aristotle raises the question, What is seed? He answers that ‘to be seed means to be by nature the sort of thing out of which naturally constituted things are produced in the first place’ (724a17– 18)’ (Mayhew, 33). In Generation of Animals Aristotle uses ‘seed’ and ‘semen’ interchangeably for the male, and ‘seed’ and ‘menses’ interchangeably for the female.

treat the female contribution as equally valuable, and the defense therefore fails.

The next offending passage in Aristotle to come under scrutiny is the place in Generation of Animals where he writes that ‘The female is, as it were, a mutilated male’ (2.3.737a27–28). This passage has come under fire from feminist critics as a particulary egregious example of Aristotle’s demeaning views of women, and at first glance this appears to be an obvious conclusion. The argument exists, however, that looking beyond this first glance reveals that this passage is not actually condemning of the female sex. The first point in this argument is that the passage in question is qualified; it does not refer to women being mutilated men, but women being ‘as it were’ mutilated men. In other words, women are not literally deformed men, but they are comparable to deformed men, because they do not perform certain functions (such as generation) in the same way as men. As Aristotle considers the male of the species the default form, any deviation from the default can naturally be referred to as mutilation without necessarily using the term pejoratively (Mayhew, 55). The second point in this argument is that while to the modern eye the description of women ‘as it were, mutilated males’ may jar, when considering historical context it may seem more natural and less derogatory. In Aristotle’s time, the people who were commonly understood as, literally, mutilated men who could not perform the same generative functions as normal men were eunuchs. Eunuchs were people similar to men who are softer, have less body hair and no beard, have higher voices, and who do not go bald. In other words, people very similar to women. Eunuchs demonstrate these qualities because they have no testicles, so, therefore, it follows that women, also possessing no testicles, would demonstrate these same qualities. The existence of the female must result from a ‘defect’ in generation that results, like a eunuch, in no testicles. In summary, keeping these thoughts in mind as well as the knowledge that it was not uncommon at the time to use eunuchs as metaphors for other natural phenomena such as plants, the argument is that Aristotle demonstrated no sexist ideological bias when 4 using mutilated men as an analogy for women, at least per the narrow definition of ideological bias which requires intent, implausible assumptions, and conflicting claims.

There are several issues with this argument. First, the analogy of women as deformed men rests on the assumption that men are the default form of humans, which is not addressed in the defense of this passage. This is the core of it: that

‘Athenaeus tells us that the Pythagoreans referred to one kind of lettuce as ‘eunuch’ lettuce - probably because 4 it was thought to check sexual desire. He also tells us that Plato Comicus, in his Laios, calls melons without seeds ‘eunuch-like’ He reports that Aristotle, in the (lost) work On Plants, writes that ‘some call [seedless dates] ‘eunuchs’ and others ‘stoneless’ Finally, Aristotle’s successor in the Lyceum, Theophrastus, discussing reeds, says that those without a plume or flower tufts are called ‘eunuchs’.’ (Mayhew, 58-59).

women are compared to men that are defective, instead of simply being considered the natural other half of the species, or even being considered as the default for humans themselves. The eunuch defense does not address this, and, while eunuchs themselves may have feminine characteristics and be commonly used as literary analogies, this does not change the fact that for a woman to be compared to a eunuch, she is being held equivalent to a mutilated man. This argument states that as the characteristics of a eunuch result from his mutilation, so too do the characteristics of a woman result from a similar mutilation: the lack of testicles. This obviously does not treat women as being natural and having equal value as men.5

This stance is indefensible, even from the narrow definition of ideological bias previously discussed. First, considering women as analogous to mutilated men benefits the male as it enshrines him as the natural blueprint for the human race. Furthermore, this passage offers no clear defense for why women have to be a defect from the blueprint as opposed to being merely the other half of it. Finally, the part of the text in question is admittedly not inconsistent with the rest of Aristotle’s body of work, but since this is only because the rest of Aristotle’s body of work uniformly treats women as lesser than men, this is no defense either.

On the topic of the rest of Aristotle’s body of work, it offers several other notable instances of Aristotle analyzing womens’ bodies in potentially sexist ways. For example, he makes the claim that women have fewer teeth than men (HA 2.3 501b19–21). He also claims that women have smaller brains than men, (PA 2.7 653a28–29) going on to say that consequently women and men have differently shaped skulls.6 He also states that women are naturally more pale (GA 1.19 727a22–24), and claims that women have softer bones (PA 2.9 655a10–14) (Mayhew, 70-86). These examples seem more obscurely misogynistic than previous ones such as referring to women as mutilated men. What does it matter if Aristotle believes women have fewer teeth, or smaller brains,7 or paler skin and softer bones? It matters because while one example taken alone may be an oddity, taken together they paint a picture of a woman as weaker, smaller, and altogether lesser than her

For further discussion of the consequences of the description of women as mutilated men, see Horowitz 1976.5

The question of whether believing that men and women have different skulls is sexist is the followup to 6 questioning whether believing that men and women have different sized brains is sexist, so in the interests of space this paper will address the latter and not the former.

The issue of whether women have smaller brains is also related to the issue of women’s role in generation, due to the brain’s role of heating and refining blood in Aristotelian biology and the importance of hotter blood in generation.This ties back to the argument over whether women are in reality less in their generative role, which will be addressed further, but can be assumed for now.

male counterpart, a picture exacerbated by Aristotle’s account of the female character, which will be examined shortly.

There are, of course, defenses proposed to this assessment, first concerning the issue of womens’ brains (Mayhew, 70-72). The argument is that Aristotle makes no explicit connection between having a smaller brain and having diminished cognitive capabilities. The answer to this argument is that while Aristotle may not have stated this in so many words, the connection is still clear given the rest of his biology. First, Aristotle thought that the main role of the brain was to heat and regulate blood for the heart, (PA 2.7 652b17–28) which was the seat of some human cognitive capabilities (PA 2.10 656a15–35), and as men have bigger brains their hearts are better heated (PA 2.7.653a29–30). Second, Aristotle thought that hotter blood leads to better and purer results for bodily functions, as seen in Generation of Animals, where he theorized that the superiority of the male’s seed in generation was a result of the greater heat of his blood(GA 1.19.726b30–727a4; 727a27– 30). And so, if it is better for bodily functions to have hotter blood, and 8 the brain heats blood for the heart, and the heart governs cognition, then it follows that having a better-heated heart as a result of a larger brain results in better cognition than the alternative state of affairs. So therefore, men have better cognitive abilities than women, which is a clearly sexist position under any definition of ideological bias.

The issues of womens’ teeth, skin, and bones may all be addressed together. The general defense for all three is that, taking a historical perspective, women in the ancient world tended to be more susceptible to health issues that would result in fewer teeth, paler skin, and softer bones than men were, and so Aristotle may very well have been merely observing the deficiencies of ancient Greek healthcare (Mayhew, 75-86). This position is speculative to the extent that it can hardly be evaluated. Perhaps Aristotle did notice that women seemed generally frailer without truly knowing the deeper scientific reasons why, but it cannot be proven that he did any more than it can be proven he did not, and so this is no good defense at all. It is far less of a stretch to assume that Aristotle in his life had the ability to observe all kinds of women, and surely not every single woman he ever met had all her teeth falling out or was dying from anemia and osteoporosis, even given the deficiencies of ancient healthcare. It is far less of a stretch to reason that Aristotle’s assessment of the female body in these instances was the result of his preconception of what women were like: softer and weaker. Obviously, these assessments betray ideological bias by any definition as they benefit men in society by treating them as

the stronger and furthermore could be easily disproved with greater scientific diligence. These assessments are not incompatible with the rest of Aristotle’s body of work, but again only because his body of work is heavily biased against women.

Aristotle’s biases expressed in his conclusions about female physicality appear further in his account of the female character.

For the character of the females is softer, quicker to be tamed, more receptive to handling, and readier to learn. . . . All females are less spirited than males, except the bear and leopard: in these the female is thought to be braver. But in the other kinds, the females are softer, more vicious, less simple, more impetuous....a woman is more compassionate than a man and more given to tears, but also more jealous, more complaining, more scolding, and more apt to fight. The female is also more dispirited and more despondent than the male, more shameless and more lying, readier to deceive and possessing a better memory; and further, she is more wakeful, more timid, and in general, the female is less inclined to move than the male, and requires less nourishment. But as we have said, the male is more able to help and braver than the female... (HA 8 (9).1.608a21– b18).

These claims are largely indefensible against the charge of sexism and consequently little attempt is made to defend them. The only real half-defense that can be made is that while Aristotle is accusing the female gender of being naturally flawed, at least he is not accusing them of being morally flawed (Mayhew, 99-102). However, a 9 flaw is a flaw.It is unquestionable that Aristotle’s views on female psychology are biased, or at least, as Mayhew himself admits, ‘strongly tainted by ideological presuppositions’ (Mayhew, 113).

The first general defense of Aristotle’s sexism now having been discharged, the second debate of interest in this paper can now be fully addressed: the role of women in generation. It is generally understood that in Generation of Animals Aristotle uses the idea of hylomorphism to explain generation: everything, including human beings, consists of both matter and form. In this case, matter can be generally understood as that which makes up the body, and form as the soul and faculties that give the body its identity. (Tress, 309-313). According to Aristotle, in generation the male donates the form, and the female donates the matter. The issue

As set out in Fortenbaugh 1969, in Aristotle’s mind true moral virtue requires an element of choice, and 9 therefore true moral deficiency is also at least partially the result of choice. Natural deficiencies are innate, not chosen, and are therefore not equivalent to moral deficiencies (Mayhew, 99). 10 It should also be noted here that, as discussed in Fortenbaugh 1977, Aristotle does not claim that the female is completely devoid of reason, but that her emotions will almost always win out over reason (Fortenbaugh 1977, 246).

here is that this position has been historically considered sexist, as Aristotle in the rest of his work on hylomorphism values form above matter. The proposed defense to this accusation is that Aristotle’s theory of generation is not concerned with gender, but instead with mechanics. The argument of the defense is as follows: Feminist thinkers have correlated the issues of generation with the issues of gender when in reality they are unrelated. Aristotle believed that both the male and the female play a necessary role in reproduction, because both the male and the female are actualized beings, and hold equal potential for offspring in their sperma, which are semen and menses, respectively (Tress, 330-31). The idea here is that as Aristotle rejected the idea that the male held the total potential offspring already within his semen, he therefore by necessity embraced the theory that the female had to contribute something vital to generation as well. And so, faced with the mechanical problem of how to explain generation while including both the male and the female and also accounting for the necessary presence of matter and form, he assigned the form to the male and the matter to the female. In conclusion, the argument is that in doing so, Aristotle had no thought to the merits of the respective genders, and therefore was not sexist in this instance.

However, this argument is remarkably thin. Aristotle states in Generation of Animals that the one who donates the form is better and more divine than the one who donates the matter (GA 732a5). Aristotle also grants preeminence to form above matter in the rest of his work on hylomorphism and metaphysics (Tress, 330). Aristotle further states that while the male and the female both contribute sperma to generation, the female’s sperma is less pure and refined (GA 737a22-30).10 However, he speaks of the male sperma in terms of the divine and the cosmic, heated and refined by a star-like heat that the female does not possess (Tress, 335). These qualities allow the male to contribute the soul and higher faculties to generation: the form. The female is left with nothing to claim but the low and common earth: the matter. There is no question that the female is given the lesser role in generation. It is a stretch to argue that this stance has nothing to do with sexist biases, especially given the rest of Aristotle’s body of work already discussed. Why, if one contribution to generation has to be lesser, must it be that of the female? Why speak of her as deformed and impure, if not out of a sense of sexism?

Both defenses, concerning Aristotle’s statements on female physiology and psychology as presented by Mayhew and concerning Aristotle’s position on

It is here that Aristotle refers to the female as a deformed male, which has already been addressed. The 10 additional defense of this comment here is that in this case Aristotle only meant “deformed” as “lacking”, since in her generative ability the female contains within herself the potential of male organs that she does not possess (Tress, 337). This can be answered with the same argument already presented- why should the female be the one considered lacking?

generation as presented by Tress, can be rejected. The first attempts a defense with too narrow a definition of ideological bias, and allows too charitable a range of potential alternative explanations. The second attempts a defense by considering too little context for the issue at hand. When considering the issues of Aristotle’s description of women as mutilated men, of fallacious assumptions about women’s anatomy, of women’s inferior psychology, and of women’s role in generation, Aristotle clearly takes sexist positions based on his assumptions about the nature of women. In regards to Aristotle’s position on the role of women in generation, it is also clear that he defaults to assigning women the lesser role. Neither defense, concerning physiology and psychology or generation, ultimately succeed in absolving Aristotle of sexism in his works.

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